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LAW NOTES
IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE IN SOUTH CAROLINA
Scom' op NoTir
Imputed negligence will bar a recovery when the person suffering
the injury, although not personally chargeable with negligence, has
been exposed to the injury by the negligence of a person in privity
with him and with whose fault he is chargeable. This privity is said
to be present when it is found that the person guilty of negligence
is the agent, servant, partner or joint adventurer of the person
injured. The problem facing the court is to determine when these
relationships exist. The purpose of this note is to discuss how the
courts have answered this question.
HISTORY
The theory of imputed negligence had its origin in England in the
year 1849 in the case of Thorogood v. Bryan.1 This case involved
two omnibuses: omnibus A in which the decedent was riding and
omnibus B which struck and killed the decedent. The action was
brought by the decedent's wife as administratrix against the owner
of omnibus B for damages sustained by reason of the death of her
husband resulting from the negligence of the driver of the defendant's
omnibus and that of the driver of the omnibus in which the decedent
had been riding. The driver of omnibus A allowed the decedent to
alight on the public highway while the vehicle was still in motion
instead of at the curb. As a result, omnibus B, which was being
negligently driven by the defendant's servant, struck and so seriously
injured the decedent that he died thereafter. The trial court instructed
the jury to the effect that if want of care on the part of the driver
of omnibus A in not drawing up to the curb had been conducive to
the decedent's injury, notwithstanding the defendants servant's negli-
gence, their verdict must be for the defendant. These instructions
were affirmed on appeal, the court's reasoning being based upon the
theory referred to as "identification", that is, that since a passenger
in a vehicle has trusted the owner and his servants by selecting the
particular conveyance, he so far identifies himself with them that if
any injury results from their negligence he is to be considered a party
to it. In other words, the passenger is so far identified with the car-
riage in which he is traveling, that want of care on the part of the
driver thereof will be a defense to a negligent third party in an action
1. 8 C. B. 115, 137 Eng. Rep. 452 (C. P. 1849).
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by the passenger for personal injuries. The question of the decedent's
personal negligence was not discussed by the court, but it is clear
that he also was guilty of some negligence in alighting from the omni-
bus before it haiLed. It would seem, therefore, that the court reached
a just result as to the parties involved, since the decedent's own negli-
gence proximately contributed to his fatal injury, but the rule as laid
down flatly held that the plaintiff would be barred whether personally
negligent or not.
At the beginning the rule of imputed negligence was accepted to
some extent in both the United States and England, - yet most of the
courts that adopted its result had difficulty rationalizing the "identi-
fication" theory as set out in the Thorogood case.3 But from an
examination of these cases it would seem that this theory was in fact
the basis for their decisions. 4 It was not long before the Thoro good
rule began receiving waves of criticism on both sides of the Atlantic.
The critics were quick to point out that there was no ground upon
which this identification could rest, since the passenger in no way
exercised any control over or interfered with the driver of the con-
veyance. 5 In 1886 the rule that the contributory negligence of a third
party would be imputed to the plaintiff on the mere theory of identi-
fication was expressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court
in the case of Little v. Hackett,6 and the same rule was repudiated
in England the following year.7 But even with such a stormy career,
the result which grew from the identification theory nevertheless be-
came firmly imbedded in several jurisdictions of this country, and it
was not until 1946 that the state of Michigan, the last state to do so,
finally discarded the rule which automatically barred the plaintiff's re-
covery by imputing the negligence of the third person to him.8
2. Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, 46 Pa. 151 (1863) ; Prideaux v. Mineral Point,
43 Wis. 513 (1878); Armstrong v. Lancashire & Y. Ry. Co., L. R. 10 Exch.
47 (1875).
3. Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, ibid.; Armstrong v. Lancashire & Y. Ry., ibid.
4. Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, note 2 supra. In Armstrong v. Lancashire & Y.
Ry., note 2 supra, the court thus commented on the Thorogood case: "The only
difficulty in it arises from the use of the word 'identified' in the judgment. If
it is to be taken that by the word 'identified' is meant that the plaintiff, by some
conduct of his own, as by selecting the omnibus in which he was traveling, has
acted so as to make the driver his agent, this would sound like a strange
proposition which could not be entirely sustained. But what I understand it to
mean, is that the plaintiff, for the purposes of the action, must be taken to be
in the same position as the owner of the omnibus or his driver." (Pollock, B.).
5. Little v. Hackett, 116 U. S. 366 (1886).
6. Ibid.
7. Mills v. Armstrong, 13 App. Cas. 1 (House of Lords 1887).
8. Bricker v. Green, 313 Mich. 218, 21 N. W. 2d 105, 163 A. L. R. 697
(1946).
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THE RULE AS IT STANDS TODAY
The general rule as it stands today is that the negligence of another
will not be imputed to a party if he neither authorizes such conduct,
nor participates in it, nor has the right or power to control it. 9 On
the other hand, the negligence of the third person will be imputed
to the plaintiff if it can be established that the plaintiff has control
or the right of control of the negligent party, or if it can be said that
the parties are engaged in the commission of a joint enterpriselo
CONTROL OR RIGHT TO CONTROL
The most important element today which must be present before
the court will impute the negligence of one party to another is control
of, or the right to control, the actions of the negligent party by the
other, so as to constitute in fact the relationship of master and servant
or principal and agent. In other words, if the party injured has any
right to control, interferes with, or actually controls the negligent
party, the negligence of the third party is imputed to the injured
party. The element of control runs throughout the law of imputed
negligence. If it is determined that the element of control is present
to the necessary degree, then control alone is sufficient to impute the
negligence of the third party to the plaintiff. But if it is determined
that the element of control is lacking in the degree necessary to impute
negligence, then the court will look further to see if there exists a
common purpose, and if it does, then this common purpose is com-
bined with the degree of control found to establish a joint enterprise.
But in any case, the element of control must be present before one
person's negligence can be imputed to another. It has been held that
where the plaintiff was driving a car owned by her father, as she
frequently did, and permitted a friend whom she met along the way
to drive while she sat beside him, his negligence was imputed to her
since she at all times had the legal right to direct the car to be
stopped or to be driven where or as she wished. The young man,
whom she had invited to ride with her, in undertaking to do the
mechanical work of driving, was acting for her."x But this case can
be criticized, for it is very doubtful if the girl actually exercised any
control over her friend. Also, where the plaintiff was injured while
riding in his own car driven by his nephew at the request of the
9. Richmond v. Va. Bonded Warehouse Corp., 148 Va. 60, 138 S. E. 503
(1927).
10. Nesbit v. Garner, 75 Iowa 314, 39 N. W. 516, 9 Am. St. Rep. 486, 1
L. R. A. 152 (1888).
11. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. McNulty, 285 Fed. 97 (8th Cir. 1922).
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plaintiff and under his direction, the contributory negligence of the
nephew under such a relationship was imputed to the plaintiff.12 But
the relation of master and servant was held not to exist between a
physician and the driver of a coach hired of the owner by the physi-
cian to drive him to a patient.'3
COMMON OR JOINT ENTURPRISt
The other frequent basis used by the courts to impute negligence
to the plaintiff is the common or joint enterprise. This requirement
represents a partial revival of the Thorogood idea since both doctrines
impute the negligence of one person to another on some theory of
agency. The joint or common enterprise is something like a partner-
ship,' 4 although it is more limited in time and purpose. 15 It is an
undertaking to carry out a small number of acts or objectives, which
are entered into by associates under such circumstances that each has
an equal voice in directing the conduct of the enterprise.' 0 The law
then considers that each is the agent or servant of the other and that
the acts of any one within the scope of the enterprise are to be charged
vicariously to the rest.' 7
The rule is generally stated that if two or more persons unite in
the joint prosecution of a common purpose under such circumstances
that each has authority, express or implied, to act for all in respect
to the control of the means or agencies employed to execute the
common purpose, the negligence of one in the management thereof
will be imputed to the others.
Today, the question of imputed negligence most frequently arises
in motor vehicle cases. In the case of Lusk v. State Highway Dept.,18
Mr. Justice Baker thus set out the general rule of joint enterprise:
. . . the negligence of the driver of a motor vehicle would not
be imputed to a person riding in the car unless such person
controls the driver or had the right to do so ....
But Mr. Justice Baker went on to say that in his opinion the general
rule was much too narrow and that the rule should be
that where two or more persons plan a trip with a common
purpose of pleasure or profit, and are familiar with the conditions
which obtain or may obtain in connection with the trip, and with
12. Beck v. Hooks, 218 N. C. 105, 10 S. E. 2d 105 (1940).
13. Sluder v. St. Louis Transit Co., 189 Mo. 107, 88 S. W. 648, 5 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 186 (1905).
14. Kokesh v. Price, 136 Minn. 304, 161 N. W. 715 (1917).
15. Hobart-Lee Tie Co. v. Grodsky, 329 Mo. 706,46 S. W. 2d 859 (1931).
16. Long v. Carolina Baking Co., 190 S. C. 367, 3 S. E. 2d 46 (1939).
17. Howard v. Zimmerman, 120 Kan. 77, 242 Pac. 131 (1926).
18. 181 S. C. 101, 186 S. E. 786 (1936).
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the means of transportation that will be employed, and with the
person who will have control of the vehicle in which they are
riding, and voluntarily takes the trip knowing the dangers and
hazards that may be incident thereto, they are engaged in a joint
enterprise and the negligence of the person in control of the
vehicle is and should be imputed to each person engaged in the
trip and riding in the vehicle used.
In the case of Funderburk v. Powell,19 decided during the same
term of court as the Lusk case, it would seem that our Court followed
the "Baker rule" to some extent, for emphasis was placed on the
common purpose, the Court saying that
* .. the parties must have some common purpose of pleasure
or profit and must be acting toward the accomplishment of such
purpose at the time when the relationship is sought to be estab-
lished in order to constitute a joint enterprise.
Mr. Justice Baker concurred in the result of this case, but instead
of relying on the rules as laid down in the majority opinion, he ap-
plied his broader "common purpose" test as set out in the Lusk case
and reached the same conclusion. In the later case of Long v. Carolina
Baking Co.20 the South Carolina Court said that the test as to a joint
enterprise was ". . . whether or not the occupants were jointly operat-
ing and controlling the movements of the automobile." In the case of
Padgett v. Southern Ry.21 the rule that was said to be supported by
the greater weight of authority and to have the approval of our Court
was set out by Mr. Chief Justice Baker as follows:
In order to constitute a joint enterprise there must be a com-
mon purpose and a community of interest in the object of the
enterprise and an equal right to direct and control the conduct
of each other with respect thereto. In other words, the passenger
as well as the driver must be entitled to a voice in the control
and direction of the vehicle. There must be a community in the
object and purpose of the undertaking and an equal right to
direct and govern the movements and conduct of each other in
respect thereto. Each must have the control of the means or
agencies employed to prosecute the common purpose.
It would seem that Chief Justice Baker had yielded to the greater
19. 181 S. C. 412, 187 S. E. 742 (1936).
20. 190 S. C. 367, 3 S. E. 2d 46 (1939). Although this case was based upon
North Carolina law, it was stated (190 S. C. at 372) that the Supreme Court
of that state was committed to substantially the same general rule which is
followed in South Carolina.
21. 219 S. C 353, 65 S. E. 2d 297 (1951).
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weight of authority, for he said that if he had applied his "common
purpose" test of joint enterprise as set out in the Lusk case to this
particular case, the trial court would have been warranted in sub-
mitting the issue of joint enterprise to the jury; but under the pre-
vailing view there were insufficient facts to go to the jury on the issue
of joint enterprise, for even though there was a common purpose,
there was no equal right of control. 2 2 And in the case of Rock v.
A. C. L. R. R.23 the South Carolina Court again said that there must
be a common purpose and a community of interest in the object of
the enterprise and an equal right to direct and control the conduct
of each other with respect thereto. From these decisions it can be
seen that today our Court follows the general rule, requiring that
there be a common purpose and a right of control before a joint enter-
prise will be found to exist. But as to the weight given to each of
these elements by the Court, there is little doubt that the element
of control tends to be greater.
The following cases illustrate the weight given to the element of
control and show that its presence or absence is controlling. It has
been held that a mere guest or gratuitous passenger riding with the
operator of a conveyance by invitation was not engaged in a common
or joint enterprise even though the guest asked to be driven to a
certain place, indicated the route to be taken, or pointed out the
dangers to be encountered. 2 4 Also a husband and wife were held
not to be engaged in a joint enterprise while riding in the family
automobile for the purpose of taking their children for a pleasure
ride and "airing", the Court holding that there may have been a com-
mon enterprise as to the object of the trip, but not as to the control
and management of the vehicle. 25 The same result was reached
where a basketball coach was driving some guests to an out of town
game and paying the expenses. The Court held that a common enter-
prise in riding is not enough; the circumstances must be such as to
show that the plaintiff and the driver had such control over the car
as to be substantially in joint possession of it.26 There is also no joint
enterprise between a hired driver and his passenger since neither was
interested in the other's purpose of the trip.2 ' But in the case of Flo v.
Plowzden 28 where a brother, who was visiting his sister, set out with
22. Id.. 219 S. C. at 358.
23. 222 S. C. 362, 72 S. E. 2d 900 (1952).
24. Keyv. Carolina & N. W. Ry., 165 S. C. 43, 162 S. E. 582 (1931).
25. Fuller v. Mills. 36 Ga. Atp. 357, 136 S. E. 807 (1927).
26. Newman v. Queen City Coach Co., 205 N. C. 26, 169 S. E. 808 (1933).
27. Funderburk v. Powell, note 19 mtpra; Cotton v. Willmar, 99 Minn. 366,
109 N. W. 835 (1906).
28. 192 F. 2d 291 (4th Cir. 1951).
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her in her automobile to find a job for himself, the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that there was a joint enterprise, thus
barring the sister's estate from recovery. It seems that the brother was
unfamiliar with the roads and was following the. sister's directions;
from this fact the Court found an equal right of control. It was also
held that there was a common purpose to be gained from the trip,
for the sister would surely be interested in helping her brother obtain
a job, and even more so since he had been a non-paying guest at her
home for some time. Also, in the earlier case of Langley v. Southern
R30.2 9 it was held that where one is driving a car by the common con-
sent of the others and is heedful of the directions of those sitting be-
side and behind him, the management of the automobile is the con-
current act of the driver and the occupants, and they are responsible
for his negligence while all are traveling in the automobile for pleas-
ure.
The doctrine of joint enterprise whereby the negligence of one
member of the enterprise is imputed to the others, resting as it does
upon an agency relationship, does not apply in actions between mem-
bers of the joint enterprise, and therefore does not prevent one mem-
ber of the enterprise from holding another member liable for personal
injuries inflicted by the latter's negligence in the prosecution of the
enterprise. This defense is applicable only as regards third persons
and not as to parties to the enterprise.30
MoToR VHICLI S
As previously pointed out, in the great majority of cases in which
the rule of imputed negligence is applied, the plaintiff's injuries have
been caused by the negligence of both the defendant and the third
person who operated the motor vehicle in which the plaintiff was
riding. The plaintiff will not be barred unless it can be established
by applying the alternative tests of control or joint enterprise that
the plaintiff is connected with the third person.
31
The doctrine that the negligence of the driver of a public convey-
ance is to be imputed to the passenger who rides in it is no longer
the law today.32 A person who hires a public hack and gives the
driver directions as to the place to which he wishes to go, but exer-
cises no control over the conduct of the driver, is not responsible for
29. 113 S. C. 45, 101 S. E. 286 (1919).
30. Mcjunkin v. Waldrep, 225 S. C. 73. 81 S. E. 2d 284 (1954).
31. Miller v. A. C. L. R. R., 140 S. C. 123, 138 S. E. 675 (1926); Bober v.
Southern Ry., 151 S. C. 459, 149 S. E. 257 (1929).
32. Odom v. A. C. L. R. R., 193 N. C. 442, 137 S. E. 313 (1937) ; Cotton v.
Willmar, 99 Afinn. 366, 109 N. W. 835 (1906).
1959]
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the driver's acts or negligence; nor is the plaintiff prevented from
recovering against the defendant for injuries suffered from a collision
of its train with the hack caused by the negligence of both the man-
agers of the train and the driver of the hack ;33 and this was the posi-
tion taken by the South Carolina Court in the case of Dozier v.
Charleston Consol. Ry.,3 4 where the negligence of a cab driver was
not imputed to his passenger.
Originally a distinction was made between private conveyances and
those for hire, but this is no longer observed. Nearly all the courts
have expressly and unmistakably repudiated the doctrine that the
contributory negligence of the driver of a private conveyance will be
imputed to a person riding in the conveyance with him because of
the mere fact of his riding in the vehicle.3 5 The law now almost
universally recognized is that when one accepts an invitation to ride
in a vehicle of another, or is a passenger for hire therein, without
any authority or purpose to direct or control the driver or the move-
ments of the vehicle and without any reason to doubt the competency
of the driver, the contributory negligence of the owner or driver of
the conveyance will not be imputed to the guest or passenger so as to
bar him of the right to recover damages from third persons.a ° In
the case of Key v. Carolina & N. W. Ry., 3 7 Mr. Chief Justice Blease
quoted the rule from Corpus Juris with approval:
a mere guest or gratuitous passenger r i d i n g with the
driver of a motor vehicle by invitation is not engaged in a com-
mon enterprise with the driver and this was so notwithstanding
the fact that the guest asked to be driven to a certain place, indi-
cated the route to be taken, pointed out the dangers to be en-
countered, or that both parties had certain plans in common.
In the situation where the owner of the automobile is present in
it but someone else is driving it at the time the act of negligence is
,committed, the law of imputed negligence has not yet been completely
settled. The view which seems to be followed by many of the courts
is that the owner's presence raises a rebuttable presumption that the
driver is the agent of the owner.3 8 In an action against the owner of
33. Little v. Hackett, 116 U. S. 366 (1886); Duval v. A. C. L. R. R., 134
N. C. 331, 46 S. E. 750, 65 L. R. A. 722 (1904).
34. 133 S. C. 335, 131 S. E. 592 (1926).
35. Southern Ry. v. King, 128 Ga. 383, 57 S. E. 687 (1907); Brannen v.
Kokomo, 115 Ind. 115, 17 N. E. 202 (1888).
36. Latimer v. Anderson County, 95 S. C. 187, 78 S. E. 879 (1913) ; Bolt v.
Gibson, 225 S. C. 538, 83 S. E. 2d 191 (1954).
37. 165 S. C. 43, 162 S. E. 582 (1931).
38. Harper v. Seaboard A. L. Ry., 211 N. C. 398, 190 S. E. 750 (1937)
(dictum); Thompson v. Malone, 16 Tenn. Apn. 152, 65 S. W. 2d 1079 (1932
(holding). But see Southern Ry. v. Priester, 289 Fed. 945 (4th Cir. 1923).
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an automobile to recover for an injury resulting from its negligent
operation by a third person while the owner was riding therein, our
Court held that the question of agency of the driver is to be deter-
mined from all the facts and circumstances of the case. 3 9 If the own-
er is not present, but entrusts the automobile to a driver who is not
his servant, there is merely a bailment, and usually no basis can be
found for imputing the negligence of the bailee to the bailor. It was
held in the recent South Carolina case of Howle v. McDaniello that
the negligence of a bailee would not be imputed to his bailor.
If the driver is, perchance, the child of or a member of the owner's
family, then the owner may be held responsible for the negligence of
that person in the operation of the vehicle on the theory of the family
purpose doctrine; and under such circumstances it is not even
necessary for the owner to be present.4 1 The family purpose doctrine
is recognized in South Carolina.
4 2
DoMEsTic RIELATIONS
Attempts to impute the negligence of one member of a family to
his fellow member, simply because of the relationship, have uniformly
failed. But this rule may be otherwise where a parent is attempting to
recover damages for loss of services or for medical expenses incurred
because of an injury negligently inflicted to its child by a third
person.
43
There seems to be little or no dissent from the proposition that the
negligence of the husband is not to be imputed to the wife, nor that
of the wife to the husband, unless they are engaged in an enterprise
giving the husband or the wife the right to control the acts or omis-
sions of the other which contributed to the cause of the injury. It
may be said with reasonable certainty that South Carolina would
follow the rule that the mere existence of the marital status would
not have the effect of imputing the negligence of the husband or wife
to the other.4 4
39. Neece v. Toms, 196 S. C. 67, 12 S. E. 2d 859 (1941).
40. 232 S. C. 125, 101 S. E. 2d 255 (1957), noted 10 S. C. L. Q. 515 (1958).
41. Davis v. Littlefield, 97 S. C. 171, 81 S. E. 487 (1914).
42. Norwood v. Parthemos, 230 S. C. 207, 95 S. E. 2d 168 (1957).
43. Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co., 188 Wis. 376, 206 N. W. 198, 42
A. L. R. 712 (1925). A similar rule is applied where the parent is suing for
wrongful death of the child and the parent's own contributory negligence is held
to bar recovery, though such a situation is not strictly within the rule of imputed
negligence. See Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Truett, 249 F. 2d 215 (4th Cir.
1957) in which the Court made the statement that under South Carolina law
the parents' negligence would be imputed to the child. For discussion and
criticism of this statement, see King, Survey of South Carolina Law: Torts,
11 S. C. L. Q. 141 (1958).
44. Long v. Carolina Baking Co., 190 S. C. 367, 3 S. E. 2d 46 (1939).
1959]
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In one of the earlier cases decided in South Carolina concerning
the question of imputed negligence, it was held that the negligence of
the parent or custodian is not imputed to a child non sui juri r.45 In
so holding, the Court flatly rejected the New York rule that the negli-
gence of the parent of a child too young to exercise any self-reliant
care for his own safety would be imputed to the child.40 But Mr.
Justice Jones, who spoke for the Court, did make a distinction be-
tween actions by or in the name of the infant for personal injuries,
and actions by their parents for injuries to the parent resulting from
injuries to the child, as for example, for loss of services of the child.
The Court held that in the latter situation the parent's negligence
would be imputed to the child and bar any recovery. This view was
reaffirmed in the case of Limehouse v. Southern Ry. 47 It was said in
the case of Cirsosky v. Smiathers,48 an action by the administrator of
a child under Lord Campbell's Act, that the administrator will not be
precluded by the contributory negligence of the custodian when the
beneficiaries under the Act are not persons charged with such con-
tributory negligence. It also seems well settled -that the negligence of
a child is imputed to the parent when, but only when, the parent con-
trols or has the right to control the conduct of the child with respect
to the acts or omissions which contributed to the injury of the
parent.4 9 In the case of Nettles v. Southern Ry. 5 0 Mr. Justice Oxner
said:
if the parent of a child entrusts it to the temporary cus-
tody of another and the negligence of the custodian proximately
contributes to an accident resulting in death to the child, the
negligence of the custodian is, on principles of agency, imputed
to the parents and has the same effect on their right to recover
as if they had been guilty of the negligent act.
But in the determination of this case it was unnecessary for the
Court to pass upon the question of the custodian's negligence.
MASTER AND SERVANT
The negligence of the servant who is acting as such within the
scope of his employment, which negligence concurs with the negli-
gence of a third person to cause injury to his master, is imputed to
45. Watson v. Southern Ry., 66 S. C. 47, 38 S. E. 1008, 44 S. tE. 375 (1902).
46. Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615, 34 Am. Dec. 273 (N. Y. 1839).
47. 216 S. C. 424,58 S. E. 2d 685 (1950).
48. 128 S. C. 358, 122 S. E. 864 (1924).
49. Lammey v. Central Coal Mining Co., 144 Iowa 640, 123 N. W. 356
(1909); Peabody v. Haverhill, 200 Mass. 277, 85 N. E. 1051 (1908).
50. 211 S. C. 187, 44 S. E. 2d 321 (1947).
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the master as a rule; but the negligence of the master ordinarily will
not be imputed to the servant.5 1 The reasoning is that the master
is responsible for the acts of his employees and therefore assumes
such responsibility. But the mere relationship standing alone is insuf-
ficient: in order to impute the negligent acts of a servant to his master,
they must have occurred while the servant was acting as the servant of
the master and within the scope of his employment.5 2 Once this re-
lationship is established, the familiar rules of agency will apply. In
this area the line between imputed negligence and respondeat superior
is a thin one, and often the courts will use these terms interchangeably.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
The negligence of a landlord which concurs with the negligence
of a third person to cause injury to a tenant will not be imputed to
the tenant merely because such relationship exists. The South Carolina
Court said in the case of Contos v. Jamison5 3 that there is nothing
in the mere relationship of lessor and lessee which should link a lessee,
without fault himself, with the negligence of the lessor. There is no
agency, joint enterprise or power of the lessee to control applicable
here which should excuse the negligence of the other. There is privity
between the lessee and the lessor in the lessee's right of possession,
but such privity cannot excuse the negligence of another whether
combined with that of the lessor or not. The South Carolina Court
seems to be one of the few that have passed upon this particular
question.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chief Justice Baker's common purpose theory as to joint enter-
prise was never accepted by the South Carolina Court as a separate
test of imputed negligence, so there is no doubt today that we follow
the general rule. The general rule is that one person's negligence will
be imputed to another (1) when he controls or has the right to control
the actions of the other, or (2) when he is engaged in a joint enter-
prise with the other. Under the general rule either of these two ele-
ments alone - control (including right to control) or joint enter-
prise - is sufficient to impute negligence from one person to the
other.
The question that arises is whether control is an indispensable ele-
ment of joint enterprise. The Court, in following the general definition
51. O'Brien v. Janelle, 321 Mass. 316, 73 N. E. 2d 460 (1947).
52. Dorcbetr County v. Wright, 138 Md. 577, 114 Atl. 573 (1921).
53. 81 S. C. 488, 62 S. E. 867, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 498 (1908).
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of joint enterprise, speaks of both common purpose and right to con-
trol as elements of that relationship, but it seems certain that the
feature of control is the dominant element; and common purpose is
only used to support it. In situations where control or right to control
is not clearly evident from the facts, the Court looks to the element
of common purpose as being some evidence that control or the right
to control did in fact exist. In those cases where the element of con-
trol was found to exist there was no necessity to consider the element
of common purpose, for control alone is sufficient to impute negli-
gence. Moreover, in every case where negligence has been imputed
on a finding of joint enterprise, the element of control was also present
and in no case was it lacking. Therefore it is apparent that control or
the right to control is the only real test used to determine the appli-
cation of the imputed negligence doctrine.
WILLIAM W. DOAR, JR.
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